#Mocks apple doomed touch bar new software#

Then future versions of the software signed with the same key can be trusted, but compromised keys can be revoked (and then replacements obtained from the website again). The application itself can still be obtained from another source, only the key has to be from the developer's website. If the program is signed by a key served on the website, and the user trusts the website, then you're done. Then the name displayed in the 'do you trust them' box is the name of the website - which is what the user is likely more familiar with anyway.

#Mocks apple doomed touch bar new code#

You have the developer host their code signing key(s) on their website, served over HTTPS. There is a better version of this that don't require expensive code signing certificates.

#Mocks apple doomed touch bar new verification#

> It also gets a shot of circumventing (or even exploiting) AV.ДЄs opposed to a shot at exploiting the signature verification method and the AV. Using keys as a rate limiter doesn't really work when one key can get you many more. The attacker gets their own key, uses it to infect many users, then some of those users are developers with their own signing keys and the attacker can use each of those keys to infect even more people and get even more keys.

Which is still possible with code signing. > The non-signed up can have zillions of malicious variants which something like Defender may or may not catch. If you make it hard, you're kicking small developers in the teeth. If you make it easy to get a signing key, the attacker can easily get more and it does nothing. The problem with CA-based signing is that it's a garbage trade off. Then the attacker makes a new version signed with a different key. In the same way that Defender can block it.

> and if it was malicious from the start, it can be disabled. The user doesn't know who is supposed to be signing the app - and if they did then you could be using TOFU or importing the expected source's key from a trusted channel without having to pay fees to anyone. If anyone can get one then anyone can sign the malicious version of the app with their own key, or one they stole from someone else. This is only true if there is some trust in what is signing them. > A signed app can be distributed from anywhere with the assurance it's the same app - it can't be maliciousified Whereas CN=FIRSTNAME LASTNAME he could probably obtain immediately (just send in his driver's license during validation). The problem here is that the Notepad++ developer wants his certificate to say CN=Notepad++, but he won't be able to obtain that until he has some kind of business or organization registered in his jurisdiction with that name. Basically code-signing certificates make it easier for people to find you and sue you if they truly want to. Your business name and physical address are injected into the certificate. Even if it's just $20.ДЄlso, the validation requirements to obtain a code-signing certificate, while certainly not bulletproof, are not nothing: you need to send in articles of incorporation and your business needs a listing with a physical address and phone number in a public directory (e.g., bbb.org), and someone representing your business needs to pick up that phone when the cert validator calls it. Funny thing about trust: I trust a developer who drops some $$$ on a code-signing certificate more than I trust a developer who doesn't.